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Guest Editorial
Medically Unnecessary Genital Cutting
and the Rights of the Child: Moving
Toward Consensus
The Brussels Collaboration on Bodily Integrity
What are the ethics of child genital cutting? In a recent
issue of the journal, Duivenbode and Padela (2019)
called for a renewed discussion of this question. Noting
that modern health care systems “serve individuals with
a wide array of preferences about how their bodies
should look and function,” they asked how physicians
and policymakers should respond to requests for proce-
dures “that may be rooted in cultural or religious values,
or perhaps … social preference rather than good med-
ical practice” (4). The impetus for their article was a
recent high-profile U.S. federal court case—the first to
test the 1996 American law prohibiting “female genital
mutilation” (FGM). Legally, this term refers to the inten-
tional cutting or sewing of “the whole or any part of the
labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person
who has not attained the age of 18 years.” No allowance
is made for what the law calls “custom or ritual.” The
sole exception is for medical necessity.1
We do not take a position on the legal merits of this
sole exception. Instead, we seek to clarify and assess the
underlying moral reasons for opposing all medically
unnecessary genital cutting2 of female minors, no matter
how severe. We find that within a Western medicolegal
framework, these reasons are compelling. However, they
do not only apply to female minors, but rather to noncon-
senting persons of any age irrespective of sex or gender.
Keeping our focus exclusively on a Western context for
the purposes of this article, we argue as follows: Under
most conditions, cutting any person’s genitals without
their informed consent is a serious violation of their right
to bodily integrity. As such, it is morally impermissible
unless the person is nonautonomous (incapable of con-
sent) and the cutting is medically necessary (Box 1).
For consensual cutting (i.e., cutting with the ethically
valid consent of the affected individual), expected medical
benefits or even nonmedical benefits may reasonably fac-
tor into a person’s decision to request a genital-altering
procedure. A consenting individual can determine
whether the downsides of the cutting are worth the
expected upsides in light of their own considered prefer-
ences and values (Aurenque and Wiesing 2015). These
preferences and values may often differ from those of the
individual’s parents and may also vary substantially from
person to person both within and across communities.
For nonconsensual cutting (i.e., cutting without the
ethically valid consent of the affected individual), the
threshold for proceeding should be higher. In other
words, the mere prospect of health-related (prophylac-
tic), sociocultural, faith-based, cosmetic, or other per-
ceived benefits cannot normally justify the nonvoluntary
infliction of an acute lesion, including tissue damage or
removal—with the associated risks and potential long-
1 18U.S. Code §116. Female genital mutilation: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/116. A second exception is listed for
certain obstetric procedures carried out by a licensed medical practitioner in connection with childbirth; however, conceptually,
these fall under the same definition of medical necessity employed in Box 1. Note: We do not assume that the capacity to provide
ethically valid consent to medically unnecessary genital cutting is necessarily tied to the age of legal majority, such as 18 years as in
the federal statute. In some cases, persons under the age 18 may have sufficient maturity to make an adequately informed decision
about whether to undergo a given body modification that may not be strictly medically necessary (see Murphy 2019). We do not
enter into the philosophical debate about the precise conditions under which a legal minor can provide ethically valid consent to
various procedures. However, the developing autonomy of young people is an important factor and we affirm that their considered
preferences and values about their bodies should be taken seriously at any age (Alderson 2017; Earp 2019).
2 We follow Duivenbode and Padela (2019) in using the term “genital cutting” rather than “genital mutilation” to refer to the
diverse set of practices described in Box 2, apart from our reference to the U.S. legal term and to the World Health Organization
typology where applicable. For detailed discussions about this choice in terminology and the relevant background issues, see, e.g.,
Bell (2005), Brink and Tigchelaar (2012), Davis (2001), Johnsdotter (2018), Njambi (2004), and Onsongo (2017). For a contrary
perspective, see Burrage (2015).
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term consequences, both physical and psychological—on
the most intimate part of another person’s body
(Goldman 1999; Smith and Stein 2017).
Box 1. What makes an intervention medically necessary?
Although the term is left undefined in the federal
statute, a common understanding is that an intervention
to alter a bodily state is medically necessary when (1) the
bodily state poses a serious, time-sensitive threat to the
person’s well-being, typically due to a functional
impairment in an associated somatic process, and (2) the
intervention, as performed without delay, is the least
harmful feasible means of changing the bodily state to
one that alleviates the threat (Earp 2019). “Medically
necessary” is therefore different from “medically
beneficial,” a weaker standard, which requires only that
the expected health-related benefits outweigh the
expected health-related harms. The latter ratio is often
contested as it depends on the specific weights assigned
to the potential outcomes of the intervention, given,
among other things, (a) the subjective value to the
individual of the body parts that may be affected, (b) the
individual’s tolerance for different kinds or degrees of
risk to which those body parts may be exposed, and (c)
any preferences the individual may have for alternative
(e.g., less invasive or risky) means of pursuing the
intended health-related benefits (Darby 2015). We argue
that although the weaker, “medically beneficial”
standard may well be appropriate for certain
interventions into the body, it is not appropriate for
cutting or removing healthy tissue from the genitals of a
nonconsenting person. If someone is capable of
consenting to genital cutting but declines to do so, no
type or degree of expected benefit, health-related or
otherwise, can ethically justify the imposition of such
cutting. If, by contrast, a person is not even capable of
consenting due to a temporary lack of sufficient
autonomy (e.g., an intoxicated adult or a young child),
there are strong moral reasons in the absence of a
relevant medical emergency to wait until the person
acquires the capacity to make their own decision.
As Munzer (2018) argues, materially and symbolically
“salient” parts of the human body, such as the face,
breasts, vulva, or penis, are “socially important and val-
ued, and are often considered striking or tied to a person’s
sense of identity” (p. 18). Because of a child’s unique vul-
nerability and the close relationship of the genitals in par-
ticular to one’s embodied sexuality, “interfering with a
child’s genitals [has exceptional] salience compared to
interference in the absence of a medical indication with
many other parts of a child’s body,” and is “generally
worse” than other such forms of interference (17–18).
How do these observations apply to the recent court
case? The defendants were members of the Dawoodi
Bohra, a religious sect within the Musta’li Isma'ili Shi’a
branch of Islam, who were living in Detroit, MI, where
the alleged cutting took place. According to the available
evidence, the form of female genital cutting typically
performed among the Dawoodi Bohra is the scraping,
nicking, or partial removal of the clitoral prepuce or
hood: FGM Type IV or Ia on the World Health
Organization (WHO) typology (Bootwala 2019; see Box
2). As alluded to by Duivenbode and Padela (2019), such
partial removal or reshaping of the clitoral hood, along
with certain modifications of the labia and related proce-
dures, are commonly classified as “cosmetic” genital
alterations when requested by adults over the age of 18
years. It is thus plausible that the sheer alteration of
healthy female genital tissue is not inherently mutilating
(or a net harm) as implied by the WHO (see Box 2), inso-
far as the individual desires the alteration, is competent
to consent to it, and regards it as a bodily enhancement.
There may of course be other reasons to object to
medically unnecessary genital alterations even in con-
senting adults (e.g., the reinforcement of problematic
norms). But insofar as “mutilation” is meant to signal a
moral problem, it is plausibly the nonconsensual nature
of such alterations that is most relevant to their suspect
ethical status. That Duivenbode and Padela (2019) fail
even to mention consent in their discussion is striking.
What could explain this omission? “Botox clinics,”
Duivenbode and Padela (2019) observe, “help some peo-
ple look younger, and breast augmentation might help
others feel more attractive—such procedures are part and
parcel of some doctors’ daily practices.” Ostensibly in the
same vein, they continue, “[n]early 80% of American men
are circumcised for religiocultural reasons, despite the
health benefit remaining ambiguous” (5).
But that is not quite right. Genitally intact American
men are not typically subjected to circumcision: Without
their consent this would be criminal assault and battery.
Neither does any substantial proportion of such men pur-
sue circumcision voluntarily for health-related or other
reasons. Rather, in the United States—in contrast to most
other Western countries—a majority of male infants are
routinely circumcised for cultural or (far less often) reli-
gious reasons at the behest of their parents (for discussion,
see Earp and Shaw 2017). This uncomfortable fact cannot
be avoided by simply conflating such things as voluntary
Botox administration or breast augmentation with nonvo-
luntary genital cutting of healthy children. Consent makes
a moral difference (Alderson 2017; Archard 2007).
In the Detroit case, the alleged ritual cutting of girls
was done by a physician, with sterile equipment, in a
clinical environment—contrary to the popular stereotype
about such cutting maintained by Western media (Bader
2019). However, the fact that nonvoluntary genital cut-
ting can sometimes be made less physically, if not emo-
tionally, harmful through medicalization does not
necessarily make it any less wrongful. A person can be
wronged without being harmed, and vice versa (Archard
2007). In bypassing (or preempting; see M€oller 2017) a
person’s ability to set and maintain their own bodily or
sexual boundaries, nonconsensual genital cutting may
wrong the person regardless of the level of harm caused,
unless, as noted, the person is nonautonomous and the
cutting is medically necessary—and thus cannot reason-
ably be deferred (see Box 3 for further discussion).
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Box 2. Non-Western “FGM” as compared to Western-style “cosmetic” female genital cutting. Adapted from
Shahvisi and Earp (2019); internal references omitted.
Category “Female genital mutilation” (FGM) as
defined by the WHO: namely, all
medically unnecessary procedures
involving partial or total removal of
the external female genitalia, or other
injury to the female genital organs—
widely condemned as human rights
violations and thought to be primarily
nonconsensual
Female genital “cosmetic” surgeries
(FGCS): widely practiced in Western
countries and generally considered
acceptable if performed with the
informed consent of the individual
(cf. intersex cases, which are still
primarily nonconsensual)
ProceduresþWHO
typology
Type I: Alterations of the clitoris or
clitoral hood, within which Type Ia is
partial or total removal of the clitoral
hood, and Type Ib is partial or total
removal of the clitoral hood and the
(external portion of the) clitoris [i.e.,
glans and sometimes part of the body]
Alterations of the clitoris, including
clitoral reshaping, clitoral
unhooding, and clitoroplasty (also
common in “normalizing”
intersex surgeries)
Type II: Alterations of the labia, within
which Type IIa is partial or total
removal of the labia minora, Type IIb
is partial or total removal of the labia
minora and/or the (external) clitoris,
and Type IIc is the partial or total
removal of the labia minora, labia
majora, and (external) clitoris
Alterations of the labia, including
trimming of the labia minora and/
or majora, also known as
“labiaplasty”
Type III: Alterations of the vaginal
opening (with or without cutting of
the clitoris), within which Type IIIa is
the partial or total removal and
appositioning of the labia minora, and
Type IIIb is the partial or total removal
and appositioning of the labia majora,
both as ways of narrowing the
vaginal opening
Alterations of the vaginal opening
(with or without cutting of the
clitoris), typified by narrowing of
the vaginal opening, variously
known as “vaginal tightening,”
“vaginal rejuvenation,” or
“husband stitch”
Type IV: Miscellaneous, including
piercing, pricking, nicking, scraping,
and cauterization
Miscellaneous, including piercing,
tattooing, pubic liposuction, and
vulval fat injections.
Examples of relatively
high-prevalence
countries
Depending on procedure: Burkina Faso,
Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iraqi
Kurdistan, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan, and concomitant
diaspora communities
Depending on the procedure: Brazil,
Colombia, France, Germany, India,
Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea,
Spain, Turkey, the United States
Source: UNFPA Source: ISAPS
Actor Traditional practitioner, midwife, nurse
or paramedic, surgeon
Surgeon, tattoo artist, body piercer
Age at which
typically performed
Depending on the procedure/
community: typically around puberty,
but ranging from infancy to adulthood
Typically in adulthood, but
increasingly on adolescent girls or
even younger minors; intersex
surgeries (e.g., clitoroplasty) more
common in infancy, but ranging
through adolescence and adulthood
Presumed Western
legal status
Unlawful Lawful
(Continued)
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As Duivenbode and Padela (2019) emphasize, the
Dawoodi Bohra also practice ritual cutting of boys
within their community—namely, male circumcision—
and they do so for similar religious reasons, citing in
support of both practices a non-Quranic source of
Islamic jurisprudence known as the da’a’im al-Islam (see
Bootwala 2019).3 Here, circumcision refers to the partial
or total removal of the penile prepuce, a highly sensitive
sleeve of functional tissue comprising about half of the
motile skin system of the penis (Cold and Taylor 1999;
Taylor et al. 1996). Consequently, the typical form of reli-
giously motivated male genital cutting among the
Dawoodi Bohra is markedly more invasive than the typ-
ical form of such cutting of females within the same
community. As Davis (2001) argued nearly 20 years ago,
a “collision course” in Western law and policy is created
when nonconsensual, medically unnecessary genital cut-
ting of boys is tolerated for any reason, but more minor
forms of such cutting of girls are criminally forbidden
regardless of the reason in the same regimes.
The “crash,” we suggest, may have just happened in
the federal case. Rather than ruling on the merits, Judge
Bernard A. Friedman struck down the 1996 American
law as unconstitutional, citing jurisdictional constraints.
Congress, he argued, did not have the authority to pass
a nationwide ban on FGM because it is “local criminal
activity,” which is the province of the states. He thus
Box 2. discussion. Given that there is overlap (or a close anatomical parallel) between each form of WHO-
defined “mutilation” and Western-style FGCS, neither of which is medically necessary, one must ask what the
widely perceived categorical moral difference is between these two sets of procedures. Controlling for clinical
context—which varies across the two sets and is often functionally similar—the most promising candidate for
such a difference appears to be the typical age, and hence presumed or likely consent-status, of the subject.
Indeed, this perceived difference in consent-status accounts for the troubling racial double standards observed
in some Western countries, whereby women from minority communities (typically of color) will be denied
genital-altering procedures offered to women from the majority culture (typically white); the presumption
appears to be that the former, but not the latter, are incapable of consenting to the medically unnecessary
cutting of their own genitals (for discussions, see Boddy 2016; Conroy 2006; Dustin 2010; Shahvisi 2017). In any
case, it does not appear to be the degree of invasiveness (which ranges widely across both sets of practices),
specific tissues affected, or the precise medical or nonmedical benefit-to-risk profile of medically unnecessary
female genital cutting that is most central to determining the moral acceptability. Rather, it is the extent to
which the affected individual desires the genital cutting and is capable of consenting to it. The same principle,
we suggest, should apply to persons of all sexes and genders.
We have added the qualification in parentheses. This is because the official WHO typology wrongly equates
the external, visible portion of the clitoris with the entire clitoris, thereby diminishing the anatomical and
sexual significance of the latter. Most of the clitoris, including the majority of its erectile tissues and structures
necessary for orgasm, is underneath the superficial skin layer of the body—like an iceberg—and therefore
cannot be removed without major surgery (which does not occur in any recognized form of FGM; see
Abdulcadir et al. 2016). This may help to explain why, contrary to popular belief in Western societies, women
and girls who have been subjected to WHO-defined FGM of various types usually retain the ability to
experience orgasm and can experience sexual pleasure (Ahmadu and Shweder 2009; Catania et al. 2007). This
does not, of course, mean that the sexual experience of these women and girls is no different than it would
have been without the cutting, nor that the cutting is risk-free with respect to potential sexual harms. Rather, it
is to dispel the common myth that FGM is sexually disabling per se—a myth that may itself cause harm to
women and girls who have experienced FGM and believe that they are (therefore) incapable of sexual
enjoyment (Mohamed et al. in press).
In practice, the most severe instances of medically unnecessary narrowing of the vaginal opening regarded
as infibulation (FGM) leave a smaller introitus and often cause greater functional difficulties than analogous
procedures regarded as “vaginal rejuvenation” (FGCS). However, the WHO typology does not distinguish
between more or less constrictive outcomes in its definition of Type III FGM, and both infibulation and
“vaginal rejuvenation” fall on a spectrum. Thus, there is no anatomically definite line between them, and in
some cases they may be practically indistinguishable: e.g., partial re-infibulation versus a so-called “husband
stitch” (Edmonds 2013; Foster 2016).
3 This is a general pattern, in that virtually all groups that
practice ritual female genital cutting also practice ritual male
genital cutting—but not vice versa—often in parallel ceremonies
for similar reasons. “It has been suggested that in many
societies, female circumcision was introduced in imitation of the
male ritual. Rationales for circumcision of boys and girls vary
with local context, but the genital modifications are often
performed with similar motives irrespective of gender: to prepare
the child for a life in religious community, to accentuate gender
difference and to perfect gendered bodies, for beautification, for
cleanliness, to improve the social status of the child through
ritual, and so on” (Johnsdotter 2018, p. 22, emphasis added).
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avoided confronting the equal protection issue at the
federal level, whilst appearing to be aware of its exist-
ence: “As laudable as the prohibition of a particular type
of abuse of girls may be,” he wrote, “it does not logically
further the goal of protecting children on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.”4
Box 3. Genital contact in a health care context:
harming versus wronging
One exception to the general prohibition on adults
touching children’s genitals pertains to necessary
parental (or equivalent) care: for example, changing
diapers or help with washing. But this exception applies
only insofar as the child requires such help; a parent or
caregiver who continued to wash a child’s genitals when
the child was capable of such washing on their own
would likely be acting inappropriately. Similarly, a
doctor or other health care professional who handled—
much less cut into or removed tissue from—a child’s
genitals beyond what was strictly necessary for diagnosis
or treatment would almost certainly be crossing an
ethical line. If the child-patient happened to be
unconscious or otherwise did not remember the
medically unnecessary genital touching (or cutting), this
would not normally render the action morally
permissible. Thus, although the level of physical or
emotional harm caused by genital cutting is one
important moral consideration, such that, all else being
equal, more harmful cutting is worse than less harmful
cutting, the threshold for wronging a nonconsenting
person in this context is “mere” medically unnecessary
genital touching. A fortiori, nonconsensual nicking,
piercing, or other genital cutting or alteration—all of
which are more intrusive and typically more painful
than “mere” touching—wrong the child irrespective of
the level of harm caused, insofar as they are not
medically required. More broadly, trust in the medical
profession may be damaged when health care providers
perform medically unnecessary procedures on the
genitals of nonconsenting persons (Barnes 2012).
Another recent legal development concerns a bill in
California, introduced but later tabled, that sought to
outlaw medically unnecessary “intersex” surgeries,
including so-called “feminizing” clitoroplasty, before an
age of consent (Gutierrez 2019). The purported goal of
most such surgeries is to make the child’s genitals
appear more stereotypically masculine or feminine,
which some have presumed, albeit without strong
evidence, to be important for their psychosocial develop-
ment. However, a growing number of individuals sub-
jected as children to such genital cutting claim to have
been seriously harmed by what was done to them when
they were incapable of understanding the risks and con-
sequences. Moreover, some express great resentment
about what they consider a violation of their human
rights (Garland and Travis 2018; Human Rights Watch
2017; Monro et al. 2017).
Similar claims are made by a growing number of
individuals subjected to medically unnecessary female
and male forms of childhood genital cutting, even in
societies where such cutting, including relatively minor
forms, is culturally normative (Earp and Darby 2017;
Hammond and Carmack 2017; Johnsdotter 2019; Moore
2015; Varagur 2016). At a recent global experts meeting
on female genital cutting in Brussels, Belgium, in which
many of the present authors participated (see Appendix
for details), it was widely agreed that the ethics of
female, male, and intersex cutting must be considered
together. What do ritual nicking or partial removal of
the clitoral hood, routine or religious excision of the pen-
ile prepuce, and cutting of the healthy clitoropenile
organ in cases of perceived ambiguity have in common?
Among other shared features, they are all (1) medic-
ally unnecessary acts of (2) genital cutting that are (3)
overwhelmingly performed on young children (4) on
behalf of norms, beliefs, or values that may not be the
child’s own and which the child may not adopt when of
age. Indeed, such norms, beliefs, or values are often con-
troversial in the wider society and hence prone to reeval-
uation upon later reflection or exposure to other points of
view (e.g., the belief that a child’s body must conform to
a strict gender binary; that surgery is an appropriate
means of pursuing hygiene; that one’s genitals must be
symbolically purified before one can be fully accepted;
and so on). In this, they constitute painful intrusions into
the “private parts” of the most vulnerable members of
society, despite being of highly contested value overall
(Chambers 2018; Sarajlic 2014). This is in contrast to med-
ically necessary interventions (Box 1), which are almost
universally valued—that is, valued irrespective of local
epistemologies, individual bodily preferences, religious
commitments, or cultural background—which explains
why such interventions are usually permissible even in
temporarily nonautonomous persons (Earp 2019).
Duivenbode and Padela (2019) are right to note that
“procedures performed within the confines of a health
care system are not always directly related to health out-
come benefits.” As they go on to state, “Our individual
preferences, cultural and religious values, and societal
norms necessarily inform some of what doctors do” (5).
But it matters who “we” are when considering “our”
preferences and values. If the imagined individual is a
baby or young child, we do not yet know what their
preferences or values will be when they grow up. This is
especially true in present-day multicultural societies in
4 The “local criminal activity” he had in mind appears to be
physical assault. See United States v. Jumana Nagarwala et al.,
No. l7-cr-20274 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2018) https://www.scribd.
com/document/393706333/Judge-dismisses-several-charges-in-
FGM-case#download (the quotation from Friedman is also from
this ruling). For a recent argument that medically unnecessary
female and male genital cutting are already unlawful, as
physical assault, if performed without the person’s own
consent—that is, without the need for a special statute
“banning” either one—see Svoboda, Adler, and Van Howe
(2016, 2019). For a discussion of competing religious claims in
law, e.g., with respect to Judaism or Islam, see Merkel and
Putzke (2013). See also Aurenque and Wiesing (2015).
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the age of the Internet. People encounter many different
ways of life. Many reconsider or even reject the cultural
traditions or religious beliefs with which they were
raised (Johnsdotter 2019; Pew Research 2018). When it
comes to such personal, subjective, and often strongly
emotional matters as the state of one’s own sexual or
reproductive organs, the grounds for predictive certainty
are even less secure (Earp and Darby 2017).
A child’s right to bodily integrity may not be absolute
(Mazor 2019). But in most cases, medically unnecessary,
nonconsensual genital cutting will not pass a threshold of
being clearly in the child’s long-term best interests (which
includes their weighty interest in being able to decide
about such high-stakes bodily interventions for them-
selves) so as to make it morally permissible (Fox and
Thomson 2017; Sch€uklenk 2012). Certainly, this is the case
in Western countries with a strong tradition of individual
rights, such as the United States. In these countries, chil-
dren are taught from a young age that their genitals are
not even to be touched by others, apart from required
medical examinations or other limited exceptions (Box 3),
before they can exercise their sexual autonomy (Earp and
Steinfeld 2018; Townsend 2019).
Accordingly, social change efforts in such countries
should aim to protect all nonconsenting persons, regard-
less of sex or gender, from medically unnecessary genital
cutting. We do not suggest that criminal sanctions are
necessarily an appropriate mechanism for pursuing such
efforts, especially insofar as such sanctions tend to be
selectively applied to members of already-marginalized
groups (Ben-Yami 2013; Berer 2015; Creighton et al. 2019;
Johnson 2013). Rather, clear ethical statements from pro-
fessional medical bodies; social campaigns geared toward
education and consciousness-raising; respectful debate
and dialogue among interested parties; moral and mater-
ial support for dissenters from within practicing commun-
ities; and non-hypocritical cross-cultural engagement will
be important for making sustainable progress. Meanwhile,
as Davis (2001) noted all those years ago, “as long as the
U.S. continues to countenance” routine and religious cir-
cumcision of infant males, or as we explore in Box 2, sup-
posedly “cosmetic” genital operations on non-consenting
female or intersex minors, “the criminalization of even
the ‘ritual nick’ cannot fail to dilute the persuasiveness of
the official stance against [non-Western forms of female
genital cutting], while carrying the unmistakable taint of
intolerance and double standards” (567).
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